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ABSTRACT
Censorship of the Internet is widespread around the world. As
access to the web becomes increasingly ubiquitous, filtering of this
resource becomes more pervasive. Transparency about specific
content that citizens are denied access to is atypical. To counter
this, numerous techniques for maintaining URL filter lists have
been proposed by various individuals and organisations that aim
to empirical data on censorship for benefit of the public and wider
censorship research community.
We present a new approach for discovering filtered domains in
different countries. This method is fully automated and requires
no human interaction. The system uses web crawling techniques
to traverse between filtered sites and implements a robust method
for determining if a domain is filtered. We demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of the approach by running experiments to search for
filtered content in four different censorship regimes. Our results
show that we perform better than the current state of the art and
have built domain filter lists an order of magnitude larger than the
most widely available public lists as of Jan 2018. Further, we build a
dataset mapping the interlinking nature of blocked content between
domains and exhibit the tightly networked nature of censored web
resources.
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• Social andprofessional topics→Censorship; • Security and
privacy→ Social aspects of security and privacy; • Networks→
Naming and addressing;
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1 INTRODUCTION
The effort expended by censorship regimes around the world at-
tempting to filter Internet resources they deem to be too sensitive or
against the morality of their own interests is on-going. As Internet
access has become more ubiquitous, the scale of deployed filtering
systems is increasing. A recent study has shown that blocking the
reachability of popular sites at national levels is widespread and
disruptive [24][29]. Advocates for free-speech and a free Internet
push for transparency and openness, while censors attempt to re-
press the flow of certain information within their networks. Key to
this is the blocking of specific webpages and the URLs that point to
them.
In response to large scale filtering of web resources, there have
been numerous studies over recent years aimed at determining the
type of content being blocked in different countries. Of particular
interest are periods of time when blocking has occurred and the
development of techniques to monitor filtered URLs and keywords
[12][13][18][23][33].
We introduce an approach for discovering filtered domains in
different countries at scale and reasonable cost. The system is fully
automated and does not require per-country expertise or coop-
eration - meaning that the safety of individuals within censored
regimes won’t be compromised. Our method applies webcrawling
techniques to find blocked content and uses a seed list of known
filtered URLs to initiate the search. We make use of DNS servers
within a target country as measurable devices. This allows us to
monitor the filter status of individual domains and sub-domains
without human intervention. The system is recursive so newly dis-
covered filtered URLs are fed back into the search to allow on-going
measurement. Results from our experiments using four different
test countries have shown that our approach can be used to find
filtered URLs that are not present in the original seed lists. Further-
more, we collect data about the linked nature of various filtered
domains to gain further insight into how different pieces of filtered
content are associated.
1.1 Related Work
Over the last decade there have beenmany approaches for detecting
censorship of the Internet around the world. Of these, many are
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country specific and have focused on China [10][18][22][25][40],
Indonesia [21][36], Iran [7][8], Pakistan [2][27] and Thailand [19]
among others.
The most widely adopted and current URL filter lists are main-
tained by theCitizenLab [9]. They are constructed using local knowl-
edge and reports of filtering in different countries and collate data
from different sources such as OONI [16].
Developing new techniques for discovering filtered URLs is a
challenging problem. Yet, this is a rich research field with numer-
ous techniques published over recent years [4]. The use of DNS
as a means of testing censorship of web content is not new, but
can be advantageous due to its scalability and remote nature [35].
These attributes make DNS a common tool for other censorship
monitoring architectures such as UBICA [3], FilteredWeb [13] and
CensMon [33].
Building in-depth and accurate URL filter lists is an important
aspect for censorship research. These collections are in widespread
use among the research community for various different measure-
ments and tests for internet reachability, web content blocking and
circumvention techniques [30][38]. Furthermore, the subsequent
and on-going maintenance of these lists provides opportunities for
insight into the condition of internet filtering around the world.
The data collected by the aforementioned monitoring architectures
is vital if we are to construct a model of censorship as it develops.
1.2 Contributions
This paper introduces a new approach for discovering filtered do-
mains within target censorship regimes. We have created an imple-
mentation of the technique and, through experimentation, shown
it to be an effective tool for building URL filter lists. Furthermore,
our results reveal that the approach has found significantly more
filtered URLs for the test countries than were currently available in
the largest public filter lists. Our formalised contributions are:
• A new approach for discovering previously unknown filtered
domains
• Experimental analysis of the technique through measure-
ment of filtering activitywithin four know censorship regimes
• Category breakdown of the types of content being blocked
within these regimes
• Analysis of forward filtered links and filtered backlinks of
webpages on filtered domains
A substantial research output from this body of work is a test
list containing a large number of currently filtered domains within
China, Indonesia, Iran and Turkey that have previously been un-
published. We aim to make this list available as soon as possible to
the wider censorship research community.
2 TRAVERSAL OF FILTEREDWEBPAGES
Traversal betweenwebpages using embedded hyperlinks is themost
widely used method for content discovery on the Web. Our aim
is to exploit the connections between different filtered webpages
to efficiently crawl sites in search for more blocked content. An
important assumption for this approach is that different filtered
webpages do indeed link to others. We demonstrate this through
experimental analysis of four different countries that are known to
filter websites via DNSmanipulation. Themethodwe describe is not
Retrieve webpages
Extract URLs from HTML
Isolate filtered URLs
Seed URLs
Figure 1: High-level overview of filtered webpage traversal
dissimilar to conventional web crawling techniques widely used by
large search engines. Given this, we aim to build a new dataset that
contains information pertaining to backlinks1 of filtered webpages.
This technique works on a simple premise - filtered webpages
contain links to other filtered webpages. We begin the discovery
by seeding the system with a number of known filtered URLs with
the presupposition that these will contain hyperlinks to further
blocked content. A high-level overview of the technique is shown
in Figure 1 and works as follows:
(1) Start with a list of known filtered URLs for country c
(2) Retrieve webpages for all known filtered URLs in our list
(3) Extract any URLs from the downloaded webpages
(4) Isolate the URLs that are filtered in country c from the ex-
tracted URLs
(5) Add the newly identified filtered URLs to the list, then goto
step 2
A number of hyperlinks in any webpage will point to resources
that do not provide utility for our discovery. We ignore any URLs
that point to static HTML assets - such as javascript, css or image
files and also remove any self-referencing URLs - hyperlinks to the
same domain for the webpage. We aim to reduce the possibility
of having the crawler becoming stuck in cliques such as affiliate
or adult site networks this way. For purposes of analysis of the
approach we visit each unique URL only once.
2.1 Methods for Checking Webpage
Availability
A key part of this system is the capability to determine if a domain
is filtered in a certain country or not. This is important as crawling
unnecessarily large portions of the Web will make the discovery
inefficient. Furthermore, an inaccurate checking procedure could
produce large numbers of false positives - detracting from the
usefulness of the results. We must also be prudent in regards to
ethical issues when taking internet measurements using such a
1Backlinks are hyperlinks that point to a certain page from other pages.
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system. Since, we will be probing for blocked content, we want
to ensure that the safety of individuals is not compromised as
described by [14].
Given these requirements, we employ a checking system that
uses DNS infrastructure to determine if domains are being fil-
tered within a given country. The exploitation of DNS as a means
for blocking access to certain web resources is in widespread use
around the globe [15][24][25][30]; and because resolvers operated
by large Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are often open, we can
use these as a basis for our measurements.
To determine the filter status of a domain, we require a globally
non-censored DNS server as a control and a measurement DNS
server located within a target country. Using these, we run through
a process to comprehensively check if a domain is filtered by the
measurement server. We examine responses to DNS queries made
for the test domain to determine if the server is poisoned [15] or
acting rogue. This procedure is described in Algorithm 1.
The following six checks are used to ascertain the filter status of
domains:
(1) A DNS query is intercepted in the target country when sent
to a non-existent DNS server
(2) The measurement server times out but the control server
does not
(3) The measurement server responds with a private IP address
but the control does not
(4) The measurement server resolves an IP that times out on
an HTTP GET request, whereas the resolved IP from the
control server does not
(5) The control server resolves an IP that times out on an HTTP
GET request, whereas the resolved IP from the measurement
server does not
(6) The content length of the webpages from each resolved IP
differs by more than a defined percentage amount
If the results from any of the above are found to be positive, we
consider the domain to be filtered by the measurement DNS server.
This procedure has a number of useful features. Firstly, it does not
require cooperation of any person or individual within a censored
country, it solely makes measurements on infrastructure. Second,
it is an efficient mechanism that is scalable and yields fast results.
Third, we can perform measurements from outside target countries
giving us the capability to analyse filtering within a wide array of
censorship regimes.
The limitation with this approach is that we lose fine grain
information about individual URLs that may be blocked. This is
due to the sole use of DNS servers as a checking mechanism -
since one can only query about entire domains or sub-domains.
Further, we require that measurement DNS servers respond to
queries from remote countries in the same manner they do for
queries made domestically. Yet, as we need to make a trade-off
between effectiveness, efficiency and ethical considerations, this
method is sufficient for use to generate good results to show the
usefulness of this technique for discovering filtered domains as a
whole.
Algorithm 1 Pseudocode for Domain Filtering Check
MAXDIFF ⇐ p {content length % difference that indicates filtered
domain}
dom {domain to check}
mDNS {measurement DNS server in target country}
mDNSFake {fake DNS server in target country}
cDNS {control DNS server}
{the following variables are NULL on timeout}
1: mFakeIP ⇐ resolveDNS(dom,mDNSFake)
2: mIP ⇐ resolveDNS(dom,mDNS)
3: cIP ⇐ resolveDNS(dom, cDNS)
4: mIPContent ⇐ httpGETRequest(mIP)
5: cIPContent ⇐ httpGETRequest(cIP)
6: if mFakeIP , NULL then
7: return TRUE {DNS query was intercepted in target country}
8: end if
9: if mIP == NULL and cIP , NULL then
10: return TRUE {mDNS is rogue server}
11: end if
12: if mIP , cIP then
13: if isPrivateIP(mIP) == TRUE and isPrivateIP(cIP) ==
FALSE then
14: return TRUE {mIP is private address}
15: end if
16: if mIPContent == NULL and cIPContent , NULL then
17: return TRUE {mDNS is rogue server}
18: end if
19: if mIPContent , NULL and cIPContent == NULL then
20: return TRUE {mDNS is rogue server}
21: end if
22: if lenдth(mIPContent)/lenдth(cIPContent) > MAXDIFF
then
23: return TRUE {mIP points to incorrect content}
24: end if
25: end if
26: return FALSE {dom not filtered}
2.2 Ethical Considerations
Implications of censorship measurements open us up to a number
of ethical issues that we must give thought to. First and foremost,
it is imperative that we do not cause harm to any persons or or-
ganisations that are unaware of our actions and motivation. This
can be casual in many ways, not least because testing of internet
filtering often requires sending network traffic to and from censor-
ship regimes [11]. Certain studies within the field have required
the use of aware volunteers who are located within countries of
interest. While these individuals are generally knowledgeable of
the motivation of the study and potential ramifications of their
actions if implicated, this is not something we as researches should
take lightly. In many cases, it is simply not appropriate to use hu-
man participants for this type of work. Furthermore, there are a
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number of legal issues with measurements of censorship based on
the techniques used - especially if inference is made using direct
observations within a target country [41].
We must also consider the use and deployment of these kinds of
discovery techniques by antagonists. Since we aim to build a system
that can automatically find alternative content that is blocked based
on known blocked content, such a framework could be utilised in
an adverse way to filter further web resources. Unfortunately, we
cannot guarantee that this use-case will never occur given the fact
that censors generally do not publish technological details about
their infrastructure and systems.
These concerns should not however reduce our willingness to
practice this kind of research. If considerable effort is made to
ensure our measurements will not affect individuals, we are able
to provide empirical data concerning censorship around the world.
This can give us as researchers a substantial insight into complex
socio-political issues that are of benefit to the community and
are of wider public interest given the state fragile of international
relations. Moreover, our proposed approach does not pose a risk to
individuals or rely human volunteers and vulnerable subjects. We
take measurements directly from infrastructure in a manner that
the services were originally designed for.
3 EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
We conduct experiments on four different countries with an aim to
build domain filter lists that are longer and more in-depth than are
currently available. This was achieved using an implementation of
the approach written in Python with the following parameters:
• Control DNS server: 8.8.8.8
• MAXDIFF (content-length difference that indicates filtering): 50%
• Filter check timeout: 10 seconds
• Maximum recursion depth2: 100
• Seed URLs obtained from the CitizenLab filter lists [9]
The MAXDIFF value is used based on a study that found the
content-length of censorship block pages are 95% likely to differ
by more than 50% compared to the genuine page [1]. Further, we
ensure that the system does not follow links that self-reference the
parent site - this is to say we attempt to stop looping behaviour
with pages that link to others on the same domain. Also, we never
revisit a URL that has previously been seen - it will be counted in
the statistics we gather, but not checked again.
The target countries tested were: China, Indonesia, Iran and
Turkey. Each experiment ran for seven days, or until no more fil-
tered domains were found. The DNS servers used for each test
country are shown in Table 1. The real DNS servers were selected
from large ISPs in the target countries and the fake from the pool of
unallocated IP addresses also owned by the same ISPs. We do this
because as mentioned previously, we aim to take measurements on
mass infrastructure within the target countries rather than smaller
organisations or individuals.
3.1 Results
Table 2 depicts the number of unique URLs extracted over the course
of each experiment and how many of those were filtered in the
2This is the maximum depth of recursion from the seed URLs
given country. We also perform a count on the number of unique
filtered domains within the list of filtered URLs. As a measure for
the breadth of each run, the Alexa Top 1000 domains were removed
so we can analyise how deep the system is able to penetrate to
lesser known sites with lower numbers of visitors and backlinks.
In total, we extracted over 80 million URLs from filtered web
pages, of which 5.7 million were themselves from a filtered domain.
The number of blocked domains identified for Turkey and Indonesia
are an order of magnitude larger than those found for China and
Iran. This is due to the widespread censorship of adult related sites
within these particular censorship regimes. Turkey passed a law in
2007 prompting the explicit blocking of over 80,000 sites, of which
many contained adult content [6], and Indonesia, a similar ban in
2010 [20] & 2017 [31].
We perform a comparison with the most widely available public
URL filter lists, maintained by the CitizenLab. To ensure a fair
comparison, we run these lists through our filtering check and
report those numbers. The figures are shown in Table 3. From this
we can show that we have performed efficiently and identified more
filtered domains than were present in the original seed lists. To
gain further insight into the types of content filtered in Turkey and
Indonesia, we remove the adult domains to create separate counts
for better comparison.
Our results demonstrate that this approach is effective at find-
ing previously unknown filtered domains. A major advantage of
this technique is that only URLs from filtered domains are visited,
meaning that we can achieve efficient webcrawling.
4 FURTHER ANALYSIS
The experiments we performed have yielded an interesting dataset
that lends itself to further investigation. We are able to track the
paths that lead to filtered content by analysing routes taken by
the crawler. This gives us a useful base for examining how deeply
connected collections of blocked sites are. Further, we can identify
the backlinks of filtered pages and the outbound (forward) links to
other filtered sites, we can discover networks of filtered sites.
We find that the results found in Turkey and Indonesia contain
large numbers of adult sites - which as explained, are known to
be banned. This observed behaviour of our tool may be due to the
way that adult websites and businesses associate their domains
together with the use of vast networks of traffic brokers, domain
redirectors and link collections [39]. Based on this networking effect
the webcrawler may traverse content within this subject matter
given the tightly linking nature of the sites - site A references
site B and site B references site A, etc. However, this is important
behaviour for this approach because different pages within each
site may contain distinct filtered URLs. The limitation is that the
crawler may get stuck in a loop within a closed network. Even
so, our results contain over 1292 filtered non-adult domains for
Indonesia and 528 filtered non-adult domains for Turkey.
The results for China and Iran show significant improvement
over the original seed lists of filtered domains, with our number for
China over 10 times greater than the input to the system and Iran
over 60% higher.
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Table 1: DNS servers used for experiments
Real Servers Fake Servers ISP
China
202.46.32.29 220.181.57.217
Shenzhen Sunrise Technology Co. Ltd.
180.76.76.76 223.96.100.100
Indonesia
202.134.0.155 202.134.2.10
PT Telkom Divisi Multimedia
202.134.1.10 180.131.144.44
Iran
94.183.43.170 94.183.92.90
Aria Shatel Company Ltd
2.179.167.100 5.161.128.10
Turkey
195.175.39.39 195.175.30.39
Turk Telekomunikasyon Anonim Sirketi
195.175.39.40 195.175.30.100
Table 2: Results from experimental analysis
Extracted URLs Filtered URLs Filtered Domains Filtered Domains
(HTML assets and self-linking URLs removed) (Alexa Top 1000 removed)
China 33,082,217 2,098,264 1576 1454
Indonesia 12,580,357 835,395 47,143 47,065
Iran 15,381,873 1,868,852 651 576
Turkey 19,250,931 913,213 39,725 39,614
Totals: 80,295,378 5,715,724 89,095 88,709
Table 3: Comparison of results to CitizenLab filter lists
CitizenLab figures accurate as of 1st Sept 2017
Filtered Domains
(Alexa Top 1000 removed)
CitizenLab Darer et al.
China 127 1454
Indonesia (Adult domains removed) 124 1280
Iran 351 576
Turkey (Adult domains removed) 131 513
4.1 Top-Level-Domain Enumeration
We perform an enumeration of all publicly available top-level-
domains (TLDs) that can be attributed to different domains - and
therefore different DNS records. We use the Public Suffix List main-
tained by the Mozilla Foundation [17]. This list of TLDs contains all
known public suffixes, common examples such as .com and .org, and
less well-known instances such as pvt.k12.ma.us. For each filtered
domain discovered in a target country, we remove the TLD and
check the domain, along with any subdomains, with all suffixes in
the list for filtering in that country. For Indonesia and Turkey, we
run the test on the non-adult domains only for better comparison.
Results of the enumeration are shown in Table 4.
Having completed this process, we find a large number of alterna-
tive TLDs for the filtered domains discovered through the traversal
Table 4: Filtered domain counts after TLD enumeration
Filtered Domains Of which, hosts exist
China 97,167 5408
Indonesia 1479 1543
Iran 5970 4527
Turkey 789 584
are also themselves filtered. During this process, we find that many
of the enumerated domains found to be blocked by DNS in the
target countries do not have records associated with them held by
the control server. In particular, 94% of the enumerated domains
found to be filtered in China received NXDOMAIN responses from
the control which could therefore not resolve them. A reason for
this could be that censored websites may be "retired" or move onto
new domains and hosting infrastructure to evade the block. While
this is a case for completely removing them from the set of results
presented here, they are still explicitly filtered within the country -
showing that the authorities continue to block access to them. This
could be due to the stance of the censorship regime or the fact that
once a site is filtered, the process for removing them from blacklists
is less than trivial.
4.2 Categories of Filtered Domains
To gain insight into the types of content being blocked, we run a cat-
egory analysis on our list of filtered domains using theWebShrinker
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Categories API [37]. This returns a list of categories attributed to
each domain and allows us to isolate from a high level different
genres of websites that are being blocked in each target country.
Figure 2 shows the breakdown of categories for each country. From
this we can see that certain types of site are overwhelmingly being
blocked over others. Of particular interest is the filtering of news
and media, search engines and translators by China, personals and
shopping by Indonesia and games and streaming media by Turkey.
We also note that the proportion of proxy and filter avoidance
sites blocked by China and Iran to be comparatively high too. This
is in line with recent statements from the Chinese government
concerning mandatory blocking of VPNs by network providers in
the country [28] and a similar circumstance around the Iranian
presidential election in 2013 [34].
Figure 3 shows a comparison of categories of the filtered do-
mains between the four test countries. This is the proportion of
filtered domains per category per country. From this we can infer
the different types of content that are under attention by the dif-
ferent regimes. For example, filtering of content within the topic
of weapons is even between China, Indonesia and Iran, however
censorship of religious sites is more prevalent in Iran.
4.3 Geographical location of blocked hosts
In addition to inferring the types of content being blocked, we
identify the locations of the servers hosting filtered domains in
each test country. This is achieved by making a DNS query for each
domain to the control server and using MaxMind GeoIP2 country
database [26] to locate the resulting IP addresses by country of
origin. The breakdown of the origin of hosts of filtered domains to
test country is shown in Figure 4.
Unsurprisingly, we find that the largest number of servers are
hosted within the United States. This is expected due to the way
many content-delivery-networks maintain peers in North America
and the fact that over 50% of all Internet hosts are located on this
continent [5].
During the course of this investigation we observe that a dispro-
portionate percentage of blocked domains for Turkey were hosts in
the Republic of Ireland. On further analysis of the domains and IP
address records we find that the country appears to block any sub-
domain of evennode.comwhich is a hosting provider for NodeJS and
Python web applications. The IP addresses of the blocked domains
are owned by Amazon Technologies Inc. as part of their datacen-
tres supporting Amazon Web Services. Further examination of this
peculiarity was not performed, but it opens the questions as to
whether certain censorship regimes will filter entire blocks of IP
addresses and domains based on their hosted locations.
Other cases of interest are the irregular blocking of Dutch sites
by Indonesia and Russian sites by China.
4.4 Backlink Analysis
For amore in-depth look into the networking effect between blocked
websites, we find the number of filtered backlinks to and filtered
forward links from each blocked webpage3. This allows us to see
how deeply integrated each censored site is within the network of
3Note that the backlinks and forward links are also themselves filtered in the given
target country
filtered content. We can look at the number of sites referencing a
given blocked domain and also which filtered sites reference the
most other blocked domains.
To calculate these, we log every backlink we find to a filtered
domain alongwith the filtered domains found to be linked from each
filtered domain (forward filtered links). This results in a large graph
of interconnected nodes (where each node is a filtered domain) and
edges representing hyperlinks between them. From this, we can
gain an insight into which domains are highly referenced within
the network and which domains contain the most references to
other filtered domains. Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8 show the backlinks of
filtered domains for each target country.
Notable observations in Figures 6a and 8a are that the top sites
that link to other filtered domains appear to be adult link collections
which supports the findings in [39]. We can also see in Figures 5b
and 7b that many of the linkers to filtered content are freedom of
expression and independent news sites, both of which often contain
political criticism.
4.5 Limitations
As mentioned previously, the filter check is limited by the sole use
of DNS. While this reduces cause for ethical concerns, it does mean
that content filtered by other means - such as IP filtering, keyword
filtering or Deep Packet Inspection - will not be marked as blocked.
Improvements to this check could increase the performance of the
tool. Despite this, we still achieve good results.
A second limitation of this approach is the way that localised
loops can form between networks of filtered content. This is a
key issue with any webcrawling system and often requires human
interaction to break the loops - large search engines offer the ability
for webmasters to provide links to new sites to improve reach. The
looping behaviour we encounter can reduce the effectiveness of the
system since the crawler does not have a means to connect other
networks of filtered sites. Currently, this can only be altered by
manipulating the seed URLs, but is not a fundamental issue with the
approach. For purposes of testing and evaluation, limits were not
imposed on the traversal between different domains and webpages,
but a future implementation could handle looping behaviours in a
similar way that search engines avoid spider traps [32].
5 CONCLUSIONS
This work has presented a new approach for building domain fil-
ter lists. We demonstrate the method is effective and capable at
discovering censored web content in multiple different countries.
Given the recursive nature of this method, we envisage that it will
be a useful tool for organisations who maintain lists of blocked
URLs. Furthermore, the system does not require large amounts of
infrastructure to operate or special access to third-party systems
or APIs. The use of DNS as a means of checking for filtering has
scope to be improved, however, it allows us to test the effectiveness
of these kinds of techniques, without incurring ethical issues in
regards to the safety of individuals.
Through experimentation on four censorship regimes, we have
discovered a large number of filtered domains that have not been
previously published. This information will be of significant benefit
Automated Discovery of Internet Censorship by Web Crawling WebSci ’18, May 27–30, 2018, Amsterdam, Netherlands
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Figure 2: Category breakdown of filtered domains for each target country
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Figure 3: Category comparison of filtered domains between target countries
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Figure 4: Location breakdown of hosts serving filtered domains for each target country
to future studies concerning research within this field and for or-
ganisations that build circumvention tools. We aim to release this
data as soon as possible.
Our analysis of the collected data shows the relationship between
backlinks of filtered webpages and hyperlinks to other filtered
pages. This shows there is indeed a networking effect between
different pieces of filtered content and provides a basis for future
investigation. Furthermore, our analysis of the types and locations
of content being blocked gives insight into the current state of
Internet censorship within these regimes.
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(a) (b) Top 1000 removed
Figure 5: Backlinks of discovered filtered domains - China
(a) (b) Adult sites removed
Figure 6: Backlinks of discovered filtered domains - Indonesia
6 FUTUREWORK
The approach described in this paper lends itself to refinement and
extension. Firstly, the method of checking the filter status of URLs
could be improved so it takes into account more factors than only
DNS, although care will need to be taken to limit potential harm to
people inside censored regions of the world. This could improve the
accuracy of the system and potentially increase the scope within
which it can operate.
Secondly, the technique could be integrated with others to form
a hybrid system. This may improve performance and reduce the
reliance on individual networks of filtered URLs. For example, the
search engine based method used by [13] would integrate well with
this approach. A combined system of this type could improve both
Automated Discovery of Internet Censorship by Web Crawling WebSci ’18, May 27–30, 2018, Amsterdam, Netherlands
(a) (b) Top 1000 removed
Figure 7: Backlinks of discovered filtered domains - Iran
(a) (b) Adult sites removed
Figure 8: Backlinks of discovered filtered domains - Turkey
the breadth and depth of discovery for filtered URLs by traversing
hyperlinks as well as making web searches. Furthermore, this may
reduce the closed looping behaviour of solely web crawling.
Thirdly, the data collected by traversing between filtered URLs
has potential for further analysis and experimentation. We have
touched upon the connectivity between filtered URLs, but there is
opportunity for deeper investigation into this concept.
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